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Abstract
We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form 
such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is 
said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way 
that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights 
of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is 
called decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show 
that in general, plurality games need not be weighted, even not when they are deci‑
sive. After that, we prove that (i) decisive plurality games with at most four players, 
(ii) majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and (iii) decisive plurality 
games that exhibit some kind of symmetry, are weighted. Complete characteriza‑
tions of the winning coalitions in the corresponding partitions are provided as well.
1 Introduction
In parliamentary voting, a plurality voting system is a system where each voter can 
vote for one party, and the seats in parliament are allocated to the parties depend‑
ent on (usually proportional to) the cast votes. If one party received the majority of 
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the votes, then it can be considered the winner of the election. However, very often 
there is no majority party, and two or more parties need to cooperate and make an 
agreement to form a (majority) government. Although in such situations there is no 
party that can guarantee for itself to be in the government, and thus it is not immedi‑
ately clear who is the winner of the election, usually immediately after the elections 
there is at least one party that claims to be the winner of the election. For instance, 
the party with the most votes/seats often declares itself as the winner of the elec‑
tion. But if other, smaller, parties form a majority coalition, then the party with the 
most votes might eventually be the ‘loser’. For example, if after election a right wing 
party received the most votes, but the left wing parties can form a majority coalition, 
then it might be that the largest, or most moderate, left wing party can be considered 
to be the winner of the election.
Typically, in such situations, whether a coalition is winning or losing might 
depend on the way how players outside the coalition are organized into coalitions. 
Therefore, in this paper, we frame debates about winners of an election in the setup 
of simple cooperative games in partition function form. We address the question if 
it is possible to assign weights to political parties that somehow measure who is the 
winner of an election. If that is possible, we say that the corresponding simple game 
supports a plurality voting democracy.
We introduce plurality games as a special type of simple games in partition func‑
tion form. A classical simple game assigns to every coalition (i.e., subset of the 
player set) either a worth of one (if the coalition is winning) or zero (if the coalition 
is losing). In such a game, whether a coalition is winning or losing does not depend 
on the way how the players/parties outside the coalition are organized. This assump‑
tion is reasonable when we define a coalition to be winning if it has a majority, since 
in that case any coalition of the opposing parties is a minority coalition. However, in 
this paper we want to address the issue of determining the winner or strongest party 
in a coalitional configuration of parties, even when there is no majority coalition 
formed (yet). During the process of government formation, different potential com‑
positions of government parties might be considered, and the parties trying to form 
a government use coalition formation with parties outside the current government 
negotiations in strengthening their arguments or bargaining positions.
Usually, in these cases, the strength of parties also depends on the way other par‑
ties form alliances, i.e., there are externalities of coalition formation in the sense that 
parties forming a coalition has impact on the strength of parties outside the coali‑
tion. Such situations can be modeled by simple games in partition function form, 
where a worth is assigned to every so‑called embedded coalition being a pair con‑
sisting of a coalition and a partition that contains this coalition. The worth is one 
(respectively zero) if the corresponding coalition is winning (respectively losing) in 
the partition. We call such a game a plurality game, if in every partition there is 
at least one coalition that wins in the partition. So, winning does not necessarily 
mean that the coalition has a majority and can pass a bill, but simply that it is con‑
sidered as the strongest in a given coalitional configuration as represented by the 
partition. For example, it is common practice that the party that got the most votes in 
an election is considered as a winner and takes the initiative to form a government. 
Although this does not imply that eventually this party will be in the government, it 
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obviously gives the party an advantage as long as no coalitions are formed yet. On 
the other hand, it might be that a party that is not the largest, but has ideologically 
close parties that are big enough to form a majority coalition with, will eventually 
form a government, and thus can also be considered a winner after the elections. In 
that case there can be two (or even more) parties that are declared to be winner of 
the election.
In this paper, we assume plurality games to be monotonic, both with respect to 
a coalition as well as to a certain type of externalities regarding other coalitions. 
Specifically, we assume that (i) a winning coalition cannot become losing when it 
grows, and (ii) there are negative externalities of other coalitions growing in the 
sense that bigger outside coalitions give ‘more resistance’ and thus outside coali‑
tions becoming bigger cannot turn a losing coalition into a winning one.1
Within this model of (monotonic) plurality games, we study the possibility of 
assigning weights to players (parties) such that a winning coalition in a partition is 
always one that has the maximal sum of its players’ weights over all coalitions in the 
partition. If this is possible for a given game, then we call the game weighted and 
refer to the corresponding weights as supporting weights. In that case, we can say 
that the game supports a plurality voting democracy. In the following, we sometimes 
shortly speak about the weight of a coalition as being the sum of the weights of 
the players in the coalition. Notice that a game being weighted does not imply that, 
when two coalitions in a partition have maximal weight, then both are winning. It 
only requires that the winner should be one of the coalitions with maximal weight.
In this paper, an important role is played by decisive plurality games being plural‑
ity games, where each partition contains exactly one winning coalition. In Sect. 2, 
we illustrate the problem of assigning supporting weights to plurality games by pro‑
viding an example of a five‑player decisive plurality game which is not weighted. 
We start our investigation of finding plurality games that are weighted in Sect. 3, by 
showing that all games with at most four players are weighted. In Sect. 4, we show 
that a majority game (i.e., a plurality game such that the winner in every partition is 
a coalition of maximal size in the partition) with more than four players is weighted. 
We also define a notion of symmetry, and show that such symmetric majority games 
can only be supported by assigning equal weights to all players. Notice that, intui‑
tively, not all players can be symmetric in a decisive plurality game, because for 
such a game exactly one singleton is winning in the partition that consists of all 
singletons. We refer to this special partition into singletons as the atomistic partition. 
It describes, for example, the situation directly after elections when no coalitions or 
alliances are formed yet.
The closest we can get to symmetry in a decisive plurality game is to require 
that all players but one (the winner in the atomistic partition) are symmetric. We 
call such games (n − 1)‑symmetric and show in Sect. 5 that (n − 1)‑symmetric deci‑
sive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are weighted. For this, we 
1 In this paper, we focus on negative externalities for the reason explained in the text, but notice that 
there can also be situations of positive externalities, where coalition formation of other parties strength‑
ens the position of a party. Such situations are not considered here.
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define the power of the winner in the atomistic partition in a specific way, show how 
it shapes the structure of the possible candidates for a winning coalition in a parti‑
tion, and explicitly use it in the construction of supporting weights.
Section 6 concludes the main part of the paper and provides an overview of the 
related literature. All proofs are collected in Appendix  A (proofs from Sect.  3), 
Appendix B (proofs from Sect. 4), and Appendix C (proofs from Sect. 5).
2  Plurality games
All games we consider will be defined on a fixed and finite player set N = {1,… , n} 
with n ≥ 2 , whose non‑empty subsets are called coalitions. A collection  of coali‑
tions is called a coalition structure if  is a partition of N, i.e., if all coalitions in  
are non‑empty, pair‑wise disjoint, and their union is N. We denote by P the set of all 
partitions (coalition structures) of N. For  ∈ P and i ∈ N , the notation (i) stands 
for the coalition in  containing player i. The partition a ∈ P with a(i) = {i} for 
each i ∈ N , is called the atomistic partition. A pair (S;) consisting of a non‑empty 
coalition S ⊆ N and a partition  ∈ P with S ∈  is called an embedded coalition. 








× P ∣ S ∈ 
}
.
For partition  ∈ P and set of players S ⊂ N , we denote by 
S =
{
T ∩ S ∣ T ∈  ∶ T ∩ S ≠ �
}
 the partition of S induced by  . Further, we will 
often write {T1,… , Tk,S} for {T1,… , Tk, S1,… , Sp} if S = {S1,… , Sp}.
Simple games in partition function form    A  simple game in partition func-
tion form is a pair (N, v) , where the partition function v ∶ E → {0, 1} is such that 
v(N;{N}) = 1 . An embedded coalition (S;) ∈ E is winning in the game (N, v) if and 
only if v(S;) = 1 . Otherwise, it is called losing. We sometimes say that coalition S 
is winning in partition  when (S;) is a winning embedded coalition. The set of all 
winning embedded coalitions in the game v is denoted by EW (v) . Notice that this 
game form allows to model externalities of coalition formation. For instance, it can 
be that a coalition contained in two partitions  and ′ is winning in  but losing in 
′ . Since the player set N is fixed, we often write a simple game in partition func‑
tion form (N, v) by its partition function v. We use the following notion of inclu‑













⊆ (S;𝜋) , if (i) S′ ⊆ S , and 
(ii) for each T ∈ ⧵{S} , there exists T � ∈ � with T ⊆ T ′ . A game v is then defined 












≤ v(S;) . 
This monotonicity notion reflects (i) a nonnegative effect when a coalition grows, 
and (ii) an idea of negative externalities when players outside a coalition form larger 
coalitions. In particular, it implies that when a coalition is winning in a partition, 
then it is winning in every finer partition that contains this coalition. In other words, 
the idea expressed here is that in a finer partition there is ‘less resistance’ against the 
winning coalition. Clearly, a winning coalition can become losing in a coarser parti‑
tion since other players forming coalitions might give a ‘stronger resistance’ against 
the winning coalition, or make the winning coalition more likely to ‘break down’.
Plurality games and supporting weights We call a simple game in partition 
function form v a plurality game if (i) it is monotonic, and (ii) for each  ∈ P we 
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have v(S;) = 1 for at least one S ∈  . A plurality game v is decisive, if for each 
 ∈ P we have that v(S;) = 1 for exactly one S ∈  . A plurality game v is weighted, 






∣ Σi∈Nwi = 1
}
 such that for each 
(S;) ∈ E , (S;) ∈ EW (v) implies w(S) ∶= Σi∈Swi ≥ Σi∈Twi ∶= w(T) for each T ∈  . 
We call w a supporting weight vector for the plurality game. In words, a plurality 
game is weighted if there exist nonnegative weights for the players, such that if an 
embedded coalition is winning, then the sum of the weights of the players in the 
winning coalition is maximal among the coalitions in the corresponding partition.
The example given below illustrates that a decisive plurality game need not be 
weighted.
Example 1 Consider the following five‑player decisive plurality game, where 
we slightly abuse notation and write for instance 12, 34, 5 to denote the partition 
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}} with the coalition {1, 2} being winning in it, i.e., 12, 34, 5 means 
that v({1, 2};{{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5}}) = 1.
Suppose that the above game were weighted with w ∈ XN
+
 . We should then have 
w4 + w5 ≥ w1 (due to 45, 1, 2, 3 ) and w1 ≥ w2 + w4 (due to 24, 1, 3, 5 ) and thus, 
(by adding these two inequalities) w5 ≥ w2 . On the other hand, from w1 ≥ w2 + w4 
and w2 + w3 ≥ w1 (by 23, 1, 45 ) follows w3 ≥ w4 . Finally, from w1 ≥ w2 + w4 and 
w2 + w5 ≥ w1 (by 25, 1, 3, 4 ) we have w5 ≥ w4 .
We also have w3 + w4 ≥ w1 (by 34, 1, 2, 5 ), and it follows with w1 ≥ w2 + w4 
(see above) that w3 ≥ w2 . We have w1 ≥ w3 + w5 (by 24, 1, 35 ) and thus, with 
w3 + w4 ≥ w1 (by 34, 1, 2, 5 ), we have w4 ≥ w5 . Summarizing, so far we have 
w1 ≥ w3 ≥ w4 = w5 ≥ w2.
Further, we have w2 + w5 ≥ w3 + w4 (by 25, 34, 1 ) and thus, with w4 = w5 and 
w3 ≥ w2 (see above), this gives w2 = w3 . Hence, w1 ≥ w3 = w4 = w5 = w2 should 
hold.
Moreover, from w2 + w3 ≥ w1 + w4 (by 14, 23, 5 ) and w2 = w4 , follows w3 ≥ w1 . 
We conclude then that all weights should be equal. However, w1 ≥ w2 + w4 (by 
24, 1, 35 ) then implies that w1 = w2 = w4 = 0 , which results in all weights being 
equal to zero. Thus, we have a contradiction to w ∈ XN
+
 .   ◻
12345 234, 1, 5 12, 34, 5 15, 24, 3
1234, 5 125, 34 12, 3, 45 15, 34, 2
1235, 4 125, 3, 4 12, 35, 4 15, 2, 3, 4
1245, 3 135, 24 12, 3, 4, 5 25, 34, 1
1345, 2 135, 2, 4 13, 24, 5 25, 1, 3, 4
2345, 1 235, 14 13, 25, 4 24, 1, 35
123, 45 235, 1, 4 13, 45, 2 24, 1, 3, 5
123, 4, 5 145, 23 13, 2, 4, 5 23, 1, 45
124, 35 145, 2, 3 14, 23, 5 23, 1, 4, 5
124, 3, 5 245, 13 14, 25, 3 35, 1, 2, 4
134, 25 245, 1, 3 14, 35, 2 34, 1, 2, 5
134, 2, 5 345, 12 14, 2, 3, 5 45, 1, 2, 3
234, 15 345, 1, 2 15, 23, 4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
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In view of the above example, in what follows we first concentrate on deci‑
sive plurality games with at most four players (Sect. 3), and then consider addi‑
tional restrictions on games with an arbitrary number of players guaranteeing 
that these games are weighted (Sects. 4 and 5).
3  Games with at most four players
We start our analysis by considering decisive plurality games with at most four 
players. A first reason to start by considering four player games, is that these are 
very illustrative, and hint to conditions for games with more than four players to 
be weighted.
A second reason to start with four player games is that, also for standard sim‑
ple games (simple games without externalities), four player games received con‑
siderable attention. For instance, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) show 
that all simple games with less than four players, all proper or strong simple 
games with less than five players, and all constant sum games with less than 
six players have voting representations, i.e., they can be represented by weights 
assigned to the players. However, there are constant‑sum games with six players 
for which representative weights do not exist. In their study of rough weighted‑
ness of small games, Gvozdeva and Slinko (2011) show that all games with at 
most four players, all strong or proper games with at most five players, and all 
constant‑sum games with at most six players are roughly weighted. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that Shapley (1962) also explicitly analyses games with four 
or less players when discussing several properties of weighted majority games. 
In particular, he studies homogeneous games where the weights can be assigned 
in such a way that all minimal winning coalitions have the same weight.
For decisive games with at most four players, it turns out that the winning 
coalition in a partition is either one of maximal size, or the one containing the 
winner in the atomistic partition. In our results, for convenience and without 
loss of generality, we will often assume that player 1 is the winner in the atomis‑
tic partition of a decisive plurality game.
Proposition 1 Let v be a decisive plurality game with at most four players and 
v({1};a) = 1. Then for each (S;) ∈ E, (S;) ∈ EW (v) implies either |S| ≥ |T| for 
each T ∈ , or S = (1).
The above conclusion is very helpful for the proof of our main result in this 
section.
Theorem 1 Every decisive plurality game with at most four players is weighted.
The proofs of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.
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4  Majority games and symmetric players
Proposition 1 suggests that, if the winning coalition does not contain the winner in 
the atomistic partition, then it is only the size of a coalition that matters. For an arbi‑
trary number of players, this fact invites us to consider the following type of major‑
ity games.
A plurality game v is a majority game if for all (S;) ∈ E , every winning coalition 
is one of maximal size in the partition, i.e., (S;) ∈ EW (v) implies |S| ≥ |T| for each 











 is a supporting weight vector for 
every majority game.
Theorem 2 Every majority game is weighted.
Of special interest are majority games where the players exhibit some kind of 
symmetry. For simple games in partition function form, several symmetry notions 
can be defined. Two possibilities are the following. Given a plurality game v, we say 
that two players i, j ∈ N are2
• switch‑symmetric in v, if for each  ∈ P with j ∉ (i) , 
((i);) ∈ EW (v) implies that (i)⧵{i} ∪ {j} is winning in the partition {
(i)⧵{i} ∪ {j},(j)⧵{j} ∪ {i},N⧵((i)∪(j))
}
;
• grow‑symmetric in v, if for each  ∈ P with S, T ∈  and i, j ∉ S ∪ T  , 
(S;) ∈ EW (v) implies that S ∪ {i} is winning in the partition {
S ∪ {i}, T ∪ {j},(i)⧵{i},(j)⧵{j},N⧵(S∪T∪(i)∪(j))
}
.
Notice that in the definitions above, we can switch the roles of players i and j. A plu‑
rality game v is switch-symmetric (respectively grow-symmetric) if all players3 are 
switch‑symmetric (respectively grow‑symmetric) in v.
Each of these symmetry notions expresses an independence idea. Two players 
being switch‑symmetric in a game requires that a winning coalition that contains 
one of them but not the other player, remains winning in the partition obtained by 
exchanging the places of these two players. On the other hand, grow‑symmetry 
requires that for a winning and a losing coalition not containing both players, the 
winning coalition should remain winning if we add either one of these players to the 
winning, and the other to the losing coalition.
Our next result provides a characterization of switch‑symmetric majority 
games and shows that, on the class of majority games, switch‑symmetry implies 
grow‑symmetry.4
2 For notational convenience, we are not quite precise here since, in case (i)⧵{i} or (j)⧵{j} is the 
empty set, then this set should be deleted from the partition.
3 This means that each pair of players is switch‑symmetric (respectively grow‑symmetric).
4 We use symmetry among players in order to introduce classes of decisive plurality games, i.e., we 
impose these conditions on games. Although it is worthwhile to study properties of the symmetry rela‑
tion itself, for example to see if these notions define equivalence classes, this is beyond the goal of this 
paper. Proposition 2, in combination with Example 2 shows that, on the class of majority games, there 
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Proposition 2 A majority game is switch-symmetric if and only if all coalitions 
of maximal size in a partition are winning in it. Moreover, any switch-symmetric 
majority game is also grow-symmetric.
The proofs of this section can be found in Appendix B.
It is worth mentioning that not every grow‑symmetric majority game is also 
switch‑symmetric, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 Consider the four‑player decisive majority game v defined below.
Notice first that all players from N⧵{1} are grow‑symmetric in v. To see this, take, 
for example, players 2 and 3, and a partition with two coalitions, say S and T, that 
(i) do not contain these two players ( 2, 3 ∉ S ∪ T  ), and (ii) are such that one coali‑
tion, say S, is winning, and the other coalition T is losing in the partition. In fact, the 
only partition of this type is the atomistic partition with ({1};a) ∈ EW (v) . Since 
the coalition (1) containing player 1 is winning in any partition consisting of two 
two‑player coalitions, irrespective of which player joins player 1, players 2 and 3 
are grow‑symmetric in v. A similar argument for player 4 shows that all players in 
N⧵{1} are grow‑symmetric in v. To see that player 1 is also grow‑symmetric with 
the other players in v, take player 1 and, for example, player 2. Notice that there is 
no partition with at least two coalitions that do not contain players 1 and 2, such 
that one of these two coalitions is winning. Therefore, players 1 and 2, and thus all 
players, are obviously grow‑symmetric in v. However, from the fact that {1} is the 
unique winning coalition in the atomistic partition, it immediately follows that the 
game is not switch‑symmetric.  ◻
If we require a majority game to be switch‑symmetric, then the equal weight vec‑
tor used to prove Theorem 2, is the only one making the game weighted.
Proposition 3 If a weight vector supports a switch-symmetric majority game, then 
all weights are equal in this weight vector.
As one can see, this result is clearly driven by the fact that, in a switch‑symmetric 
majority game, all largest coalitions in a partition are winning in it.
1234 12, 34 14, 2, 3
123, 4 12, 3, 4 23, 1, 4
124, 3 13, 24 24, 1, 3
134, 2 13, 2, 4 34, 1, 2
234, 1 14, 23 1, 2, 3, 4
Footnote 4 (continued)
is an implication only in one direction. Examples 3 and 4 (in Sect. 5) show that, on the class of (n − 1)
‑symmetric games, the above two statements are independent.
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5  (n − 1)‑symmetric games
We have defined decisive plurality games as games where there is exactly one win‑
ning coalition in each partition. Since this implies that there is a unique winner in 
the atomistic partition, no decisive plurality game is switch‑symmetric. The ‘most 
symmetric’ a game can be is if all other players are symmetric. Therefore, we call a 
decisive plurality game (n − 1)‑ switch-symmetric if all players but one (the winner 
in the atomistic partition) are switch‑symmetric in the game. We study the impact 
of this restriction on the game’s support. Due to the decisiveness of v, the following 
result is immediate.
Proposition 4 Let v be a decisive plurality game with at least three players and 
v({1};a) = 1. If v is (n − 1) -switch-symmetric, then all players in N⧵{1} are 
switch-symmetric in v.
Recall from Proposition 2, that for the case of majority games, grow‑symmetry 
is implied by switch‑symmetry. We define a decisive plurality game v to be (n − 1)
-grow-symmetric if all players but one (the winner in the atomistic partition) are 
grow‑symmetric in v, and show that (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetry and (n − 1)‑grow‑
symmetry are independent properties.
For this, let us first show that (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetry does not imply (n − 1)
‑grow‑symmetry.
Example 3 Consider the six‑player (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetric decisive game v with 
player set N = {1, i, j, k,,m} and coalition (1) winning in every partition  ∈ P , 
except in the partitions of type {{1}, {i, j, k}, {,m}} , {{1}, {i, j, k}, {}, {m}} , 
{{1}, {i, j, k,}, {m}} , and {{1}, {i, j, k,,m}} where it is always the largest coali‑
tion in the partition that wins. The game is indeed (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetric since 
exchanging any two players from N⧵{1} does not change the size of the (corre‑
sponding) winning coalition in a partition. Suppose now that the game v is (n − 1)
‑grow‑symmetric and consider for instance players  and m. Then 1, ijk,m should 
imply that 1m, ijk which is in contradiction to the fact that {1,m} wins in the parti‑
tion {{1,m}, {i, j, k,}}.  ◻
Our next example shows that (n − 1)‑grow‑symmetry does not imply (n − 1)
‑switch‑symmetry.
Example 4 Consider the five‑player decisive majority game v on N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
where, for every partition  ∈ P containing exactly two coalitions S and T of maxi‑
mal size, we have that 1 ∈ S ∪ T  implies ((1);) ∈ EW (v) , while 1 ∉ S ∪ T  implies 
((2);) ∈ EW (v) . Assume additionally that ({1};a) ∈ EW (v) . Obviously, players 
3, 4 and 5 are grow‑symmetric in v. To show that players 2 and 3 are also grow‑
symmetric in v, notice that the only partitions containing two coalitions that do not 
contain either of these two players, such that one of these coalitions is winning, are 
1, 45, 2, 3 ; 4, 15, 23 ; 4, 15, 2, 3 ; 5, 14, 23 ; 5, 14, 2, 3 ; and the atomistic partition. By 
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majority, the winning coalition in these partitions stays winning after either player 
2 or player 3 joins, showing that players 2 and 3, and thus all players in N⧵{1} are 
grow‑symmetric in v; thus, the game is (n − 1)‑grow‑symmetric. Notice, however, 
that the game is not (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetric since, considering players 2 and 4, we 
have that {2, 5} wins in {{2, 5}, {3, 4}, {1}} but {4, 5} loses in {{2, 3}, {4, 5}, {1}}.
In what follows, we call a decisive plurality game v
• (n − 1)-symmetric, if all players but the winner in the atomistic partition are 
both switch‑ and grow‑symmetric in v.
(n − 1)‑symmetric decisive plurality games turn out to be weighted (Theorem 3). 
We show this by proving important implications (stated in Propositions 4‑6) on 
the winning embedded coalitions in such games. In these results, we also explic‑
itly state the type of (n − 1)‑symmetry (i.e., (n − 1)‑symmetry, (n − 1)‑switch‑
symmetry, or (n − 1)‑grow‑symmetry) which is used in the corresponding proofs. 
All proofs of this section are provided in Appendix C.
We start by showing that in (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetric games, a winning coa‑
lition in a partition either contains the winner in the atomistic partition, or has 
strictly more players than any other coalition in the partition.
Proposition 5 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -switch-symmetric plurality game with 
v({1};a) = 1. Then (S;) ∈ EW (v) implies either S = (1) or |S| > |T| for each 
T ∈ ⧵{S,(1)}.
This proposition gives as a corollary that in a partition having two or more 
coalitions of maximal size, the winning coalition should contain the winner in the 
atomistic partition.
Corollary 1 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -switch-symmetric plurality game with 
v({1};a) = 1, and let  ∈ P. If ⧵{(1)} contains at least two largest coalitions, 
then ((1);) ∈ EW (v).
Define P1 = { ∈ P ∣ {1} ∈ } as the collection of those partitions that con‑
tain singleton {1} . In what follows, we make use of the power p1(v) of player 1 in 
a decisive plurality game v with v({1};a) = 1 , and define it as
that is, it is the size of a largest coalition that loses against {1} in some partition 
from P1 . We denote by P
∗ the set of all partitions in which there is only one largest 
coalition that does not contain player 1. For  ∈ P∗ , S

 stands for the largest coali‑
tion in ⧵{(1)}.
Our next result explains the crucial role of p1(v) in determining the winning 
coalitions in the partitions contained in P∗.
p1(v) = max
∈P1
{t ∣ ∃T ∈  with |T| = t and ({1};) ∈ EW (v)},
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Proposition 6 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -symmetric plurality game with at least 
five players and v({1};a) = 1, and let  ∈ P∗. Then,







2. ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| implies ((1);) ∈ EW (v) .
Corollary 1 and Proposition 6 allow for a complete characterization of the win‑
ning embedded coalitions in (n − 1)‑symmetric games. For  ∈ P , the coalition (1) 
is winning in  when either ⧵{(1)} contains at least two largest coalitions, or the 
unique largest coalition in ⧵{(1)} is smaller than the threshold level p1(v) + |(1)| . 
Otherwise, it is the unique largest coalition which wins in the partition  . Notice that, 
in the two cases where (1) is winning in  , a coalition S ∈  with |S| > |𝜋(1)| may 
exist; so, it is not necessarily that a largest coalition wins in a partition.
The value p1(v) also plays an important role in the following main result on 
(n − 1)‑symmetric plurality games, which gives explicit supporting weights for a 
decisive (n − 1)‑symmetric plurality game.
Theorem  3 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -symmetric plurality game with 




 and wi =
1
p1(v)+|N|−1
 for each i ∈ N⧵{1} supports v.
The following example sheds light on how the results in this section lead to a 
plurality game being weighted.
Example 5 Consider a five‑player decisive and (n − 1)‑symmetric game v with 
v({1};a) = 1 . Notice first that it is impossible for the power of player 1 in the game 
v to be p1(v) = 1 . The reason is that p1(v) = 1 would imply that in the partition 
{{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}} either {2, 3} or {4, 5} should be winning, which is a contradic‑
tion to Corollary 1. So, p1(v) ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
If p1(v) = 4 , then ({1};{{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5}}) ∈ EW (v) and thus, by monotonicity, the 


















 supports the game v.
Suppose next that p1(v) = 3 holds. Since p1(v) + |(1)| ≥ 4 , we have, by Corol‑
lary  1 and Proposition  6, that (1) is winning in all partitions except in 


















 supports the game v.
Finally, consider the case of p1(v) = 2 . Due to p1(v) + |(1)| ≥ 3 , we have, by 
Corollary  1 and Proposition  6, that (1) is winning in all partitions except in 
{{1}, {i, j, k}, {}} (where {i, j, k} is winning) and {{1}, {i, j, k,}} (where {i, j, k,} 

















 supports the game v.
Let us finally remark that decisive plurality games are always weighted in case there 
are no externalities. We say that a plurality game v is  externality-free if v(S;) = v(S;�) 
holds for all S ⊆ N and for all partitions ,� ∈ P such that S ∈  ∩ �.
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Proposition 7 Every externality-free, decisive plurality game is weighted.
This proposition makes clear that problems with decisive plurality games 
being not weighted arise from the existence of (negative) externalities.
6  Related literature
In our study about the possibility of assigning weights to players in simple parti‑
tion function form games, we have presented classes of games which do allow 
for a weighted representation. Moreover, the support of the corresponding games 
was shown to crucially shape the set of possible winning coalitions in a partition 
and thus, to shed light on which coalitions are most powerful in the presence of 
(negative) externalities. This naturally places our work within the strands of lit‑
erature devoted to the numerical representation of standard simple games as well 
as to the study of general partition function form games.
The first strand of literature is mainly concerned with the question whether it is 
(always) possible to represent a standard simple game as a weighted majority game, 
that is, to find non‑negative weights and a positive real number (quota) such that a 
coalition is winning in the simple game if and only if the combined weights of its 
members weakly exceeds the quota. As shown by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944), not all simple games do allow for such weighted majority representation. 
The question of finding properties that characterize weighted games within the class 
of simple games was then naturally posted by Isbell (1956, (1958), and answered by 
Elgot (1961) and Taylor and Zwicker (1992). More precisely, Taylor and Zwicker 
(1992) characterize weighted voting in terms of the ways in which coalitions can 
gain or lose by trading among themselves, while Hammet et  al. (1981) and Einy 
and Lehrer (1989) answer the above question by using results about separating con‑
vex sets. Peleg (1968) and Sudhölter (1996) show for the case of (constant‑sum) 
weighted majority games that, correspondingly, the nucleolus and the modified 
nucleolus induce a representation of the game.
If a standard simple game does not allow for a weighted representation, then 
one might consider rough weights (cf. Taylor and Zwicker 1999). A simple game 
is roughly weighted if there exist weights and a threshold such that every coalition 
with the sum of its players’ weights being above (respectively below) the threshold 
is winning (respectively losing). Again, not all standard simple games turn out to be 
roughly weighted. Gvozdeva and Slinko (2011) give necessary and sufficient condi‑
tions for a simple game to have rough weights. Related to the issue of non‑weight‑
edness of games, Carreras and Freixas (1996) and Freixas and Molinero (2009) 
investigate complete simple games being simple games behaving in some respects as 
weighted simple games.
All the papers cited above deal with standard simple games, while the focus of 
our work is on the weighted representation of plurality games which we defined as 
special type of simple games in partition function form. To the best of our knowl‑
edge, we are the first to study and provide conditions assuring weighted representa‑
tions of such games.
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The second strand of related literature deals with general partition function form 
games as initiated by the seminal works of Thrall (1962) and Thrall and Lucas 
(1963), and recently surveyed by Koczy (2018). Besides the investigation of gen‑
eral properties of such games (e.g., Lucas and Marcelli 1978; Maskin 2003; Hafa‑
lir 2007), there are two main issues of simultaneous interest in the corresponding 
works: which coalitions will form (cf. Ray 2007), and how the coalitional worths 
will be allocated to their members. For instance, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) sep‑
arate the intrinsic payoffs from those due to the externalities of coalition formation. 
However, the main focus in that literature has been on extending the Shapley value 
for games with externalities (e.g., Myerson 1977; Gilboa and Lehrer 1991; Albizuri 
et  al. 2005; Macho‑Stadler et  al. 2007, de Clippel and Serrano (2008); McQuillin 
(2009); Dutta et al. (2010); Grabisch and Funaki (2012)) and on extending differ‑
ent power indices to the class of simple games with externalities (e.g., Bolger 1986; 
Alonso‑Meijide et al. 2017; Alvarez Mozos et al. 2017).
Although the study of power indices for simple partition function form games 
was out of the scope of this paper, we nevertheless used a notion of power (for the 
winner in the atomistic partition) in order to derive our results with respect to (n − 1)
‑symmetric plurality games. In follow‑up research, we intend to generalize this 
notion as to apply to each player, to investigate in detail its properties, and to axi‑
omatically characterize it.
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Appendix: Proofs from Sect. 3
Proof of Proposition 1 Notice first that for |N| ≤ 3 the assertion follows by {1} 
being winning in the atomistic partition and the monotonicity of v. Suppose now 
that |N| = 4 , i.e., N = {i, j, k,} , and let there exist (S;) ∈ E with (S;) ∈ EW (v) , 
1 ∉ S , and |S| < |T| for some T ∈  . We show that this leads to a contradic‑
tion. Since there are only four players, we have |S| = 1 . Assume, w.l.o.g., that 
(S;) = ({i};{{i}, {j}, {k,}}) with i ≠ 1 holds. Then, by monotonicity of v, 
({i};{{i}, {j}, {k}, {}}) ∈ EW (v) should hold as well, giving a contradiction 
to v being decisive and {i} ≠ {1} . By a similar argument, it can be shown that 
(S;) ∈ EW (v) cannot be of the form {{i};{{i}, {j, k,}}} with i ≠ 1 .   ◻
Proof of Theorem 1 Let v be a decisive plurality game defined on the player set N and 







) supports the game v.
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If |N| = 3 , let us take N = {1, j, k} . By monotonicity of v, 
({1, j};{{1, j}, {k}}) ∈ EW (v) and ({1, k};{{1, k}, {j}}) ∈ EW (v) holds. Take the 
weight vector w with w1 =
1
2
 and wj = wk =
1
4
 . Notice that it supports v indepen‑
dently of the fact whether coalition {1} or coalition {j, k} is winning in the partition 
{{1}, {j, k}}.
Finally, if |N| = 4 let us take N = {1, j, k,} . Since player 1 is winning in the 
atomistic partition, we have that if supporting weights w do exist, it must hold that 
w1 ≥ wj,wk,w . We distinguish the following cases with respect to bipartitions con‑
taining coalitions of size 2.
Case 1 (Player 1 is in no winning coalition in a bipartition of this type). Let v 
be such that ({k,};{{1, j}, {k,}}) ∈ EW (v) , ({j,};{{1, k}, {j,}}) ∈ EW (v) , and 












) . Notice that it sup‑
ports v for the winning coalitions in the above partitions. Further, by monotonic‑
ity of v, ({k,};{{1}, {j}, {k,}}) ∈ EW (v) , ({j,};{{1}, {k}, {j,}}) ∈ EW (v) , 
and ({j, k};{{1}, {}, {j, k}}) ∈ EW (v) . Clearly, w is a suitable weight vec‑
tor for these embedded coalitions as well. Again by monotonicity of v, 
({j, k,};{{1}, {j, k,}}) ∈ EW (v) and weight vector w still works here. We con‑
clude that weight vector w indeed supports game v.
Case 2 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of one bipartition of this type). Let 
v be such that ({1, j};{{1, j}, {k,}}) ∈ EW (v) , ({j,};{{1, k}, {j,}}) ∈ EW (v) , and 






= wk = w 
works for these winning embedded coalitions. It can be checked that w is a suitable 
weight vector also in the embedded coalitions (S;{{k,}, {1}, {j}}) , irrespective of 
the winning coalition S ∈ {{k,}, {1}, {j}} . The winning coalitions in the other par‑
titions are determined by monotonicity of the game as displayed in Table 1. In this 
table, the single underlined coalitions are winning in the corresponding partitions by 
assumption, and the double underlined coalitions are winning by monotonicity. A 
partition with no underlined coalition displays the fact that the assumptions do not 
exactly determine which coalition is winning.
Case 3 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of two bipartitions of this type). Let 
v be such that ({1, j};{{1, j}, {k,}}) ∈ EW (v) , ({1, k};{{1, k}, {j,}}) ∈ EW (v) , 
and ({j, k};{{1,}, {j, k}}) ∈ EW (v) . Take the weight vector w with 
w1 = wj = wk =
1
3
> 0 = w

 . It can be checked that w is a suitable weight vector, 
also irrespective of the winning coalitions in the partitions {{j,}, {1}, {k}} and 
Table 1  Proof of Theorem 1, 
Case 2 1jk 1j, k 1,, jk
1k, j 1j, k, 1k, j,
1j, k 1k, j 1, j, k
1jk, 1, k, j 1, j, k
jk, 1 1, jk 1, j, k,
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{{k,}, {1}, {j}} . The winning coalitions in the other partitions are determined by 
monotonicity of the game, see Table 2.
Case 4 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of all (three) bipartitions of this type). 
Let v be such that ({1, j};{{1, j}, {k,}}) ∈ EW (v) , ({1, k};{{1, k}, {j,}}) ∈ EW (v) , 
and ({1,};{{1,}, {j, k}}) ∈ EW (v) . Two sub‑cases have to be considered:




wj = wk = w =
1
5
 . It can be checked that w is a suitable weight vector, also in 
the embedded coalitions with partitions {{j, k}, {1}, {}} , {{j,}, {1}, {k}} , and 
{{k,}, {1}, {j}} , irrespective of the winning coalitions in these partitions; notice that, 
due to Proposition  1, there is no winning singleton in these partitions which differs 
from {1} . The winners in the other partitions are determined by monotonicity of the 
game, see Table 3.
(4.2) ({1};{{1}, {j, k,}}) ∈ EW (v) . Then, by monotonicity, in every partition 
the winning coalition is the one containing player 1. Take the weight vector w with 
w1 = 1 > 0 = wj = wk = w . It can be checked that w is a suitable weight vector by 
just applying the monotonicity of the game, see Table 4.   ◻
Table 2  Proof of Theorem 1, 
Case 3 1jk 1j, k 1,, jk
1k, j 1j, k, 1k, j,
1j, k 1k, j 1, j, k
1jk, 1, k, j 1, j, k
jk, 1 1, jk 1, j, k,
Table 3  Proof of Theorem 1, 
Case 4.1 1jk 1j, k 1,, jk
1k, j 1j, k, 1k, j,
1j, k 1k, j 1, j, k
1jk, 1, k, j 1, j, k
jk, 1 1, jk 1, j, k,
Table 4  Proof of Theorem 1, 
Case 4.2 1jk 1j, k 1,, jk
1k, j 1j, k, 1k, j,
1j, k 1k, j 1, j, k
1jk, 1, k, j 1, j, k
jk, 1 1, jk 1, j, k,
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Appendix: Proofs from Sect. 4
Proof of Proposition 2 We first show that if in a majority game v all coalitions 
of maximal size in a partition are winning in it, then the game is switch‑sym‑
metric. Suppose that, on the contrary, there were two players, i and j, who are 
not switch‑symmetric in v. In such a case, there should be S ⊂ N with i ∈ S and 
j ∉ S such that (S;) ∈ EW (v), but S⧵{i} ∪ {j} is not winning in the partition {
S⧵{i} ∪ {j},(j)⧵{j} ∪ {i},N⧵(S∪(j))
}
 . Since S and S⧵{i} ∪ {j} are of the same 
size, by v being a majority game, S is a largest coalition in  , and thus S⧵{i} ∪ {j} 
is a largest coalition in 
{
S⧵{i} ∪ {j},(j)⧵{j} ∪ {i},N⧵(S∪(j))
}
 . By supposition, 
(S⧵{i}) ∪ {j} should be winning in that partition, which gives a contradiction.
Let us show next that if a majority game v is switch‑symmetric, then all coalitions 
of maximal size in a partition are winning in it. Notice first that, by the definition 
of a majority game, a winning coalition in a partition should be of maximal size. 
We are left to show that all coalitions of maximal size are winning. For this, take 
(S;) ∈ EW (v) and suppose that there is T ∈ ⧵{S} with |T| = |S| . Since the game is 
switch‑symmetric, we can (repeatedly) replace all players from S⧵T  by those from 
T⧵S and conclude that (T;) ∈ EW (v) should hold.
Finally, to show that every switch‑symmetric majority game is also grow‑
symmetric, consider a switch‑symmetric majority game v and let us show that 
the game is also grow‑symmetric. Take i, j ∈ N , and let  ∈ P with S, T ∈  
be such that (S;) ∈ EW (v) and i, j ∉ S ∪ T  . Consider then the partition 
� =
{
S ∪ {i}, T ∪ {j},N⧵(S∪T∪{i,j})
}
 . If S is the unique largest coalition in  , then 





∈ EW (v) . Suppose now that S and T are two largest coalitions 
in  . In such a case, S ∪ {i} and T ∪ {j} will be two largest coalitions also in ′ . 
Since the majority game v is switch‑symmetric, it follows from the above char‑
acterization of such games that all largest coalitions in ′ are winning in it, i.e., (
S ∪ {i};�
)
∈ EW (v) . We conclude that the game v is grow‑symmetric as well.   ◻
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that a switch‑symmetric majority game v is sup‑
ported by a weight vector w. Consider the atomistic partition a and notice that, by 
Proposition 2, ({i};a) ∈ EW (v) holds for each i ∈ N . Since the game v is weighted, 
we have that the inequalities wk ≥ w and w ≥ wk hold for all k, ∈ N . We con‑
clude then that all weights should be equal.   ◻
Appendix: Proofs from Sect. 5
Proof of Proposition 4 Since {1} is the unique winning coalition in the atomistic par‑
tition, player 1 cannot be switch‑symmetric in v with any other player due to the 
decisiveness of the game. By definition of (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetry of v, all players 
in N⧵{1} are switch‑symmetric in v.   ◻
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Proof of Proposition 5 Take (S;) ∈ EW (v) and suppose that S ≠ (1) . Notice that 
|S| > 1 should hold; otherwise, by monotonicity, the single player in S should be 
winning in the atomistic partition, which is in contradiction to the decisiveness of 
v and {1} being the winner in the atomistic partition. We now have to show that 
|T| ≥ |S| for some T ∈ ⧵{S,(1)} , leads to a contradiction.
Suppose that such a coalition T exists. Take T ′ ⊆ T  with |T �| = |S| . Since the 
game is (n − 1)‑switch‑symmetric (and all players in S ∪ T  are switch‑symmetric in v 
since both coalitions do not contain player 1), we can (repeatedly) replace all players 




T �, S ∪ (T⧵T �),N⧵(S∪T)
})





) = (T;) ∈ EW (v) should hold as well, which 
is a contradiction to (S;) ∈ EW (v) and the decisiveness of the game.   ◻
The following two lemmas will be used in the proofs of Proposition  6 and 
Theorem 3.
Lemma 1 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -switch-symmetric plurality game with at 




,… , |N| − 1
}





,… , |N| − 1
}
 if |N| is even.
Proof of Lemma 1 Clearly, the largest coalition that could lose against {1} in a 
partition is N⧵{1} . Suppose first that |N| is odd and thus, there exists a parti‑
tion  = {{1}, S, T} with |S| = |T| = |N|−1
2
 . By Corollary  1, ({1};) ∈ EW (v) , 
and thus, pv(1) ≥
|N|−1
2
 should hold. If |N| is even, one can take the partition 
� =
{
{1}, S�, T �, {i}
}
 with |S�| = |T �| = |N|−2
2




 must be the case.  ◻
Lemma 2 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1) -switch-symmetric plurality game with 
at least five players and v({1};a) = 1, and let  ∈ P∗. Then ||S|| ≥ p1(v)  implies 












such that |S| > p1(v) . If |N| is odd, then ||S𝜋|| + |S| > 2p1(v) ≥ |N| − 1 where the 
second inequality follows from Lemma 1. Since 1 ∉ S

∪ S , we have a contradic‑
tion. If |N| is even, then ||S𝜋|| + |S| > 2p1(v) ≥ |N| − 2 where the second inequality 
again follows from Lemma  1. Since 1 ∉ S





 . Notice then that ||S𝜋|| > |S| ≥ p1(v) + 1 =
|N|
2
 holds with the 
first inequality following from  ∈ P∗ and the second from |S| > p1(v) . We have 
then ||S𝜋|| + |S| > |N| , which leads to a contradiction.   ◻
Proof of Proposition 6 We consider the two assertions separately. 
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Suppose that ||S|| ≥ p1(v) + |(1)| . Let S′𝜋 ⊆ S𝜋 contain exactly p1(v) + 1 players. 












= ({1};�) ∈ Ew(v) would imply, by decisiveness of v, that S′ loses 
against {1} in ′ . By ||S�𝜋|| = p1(v) + 1 > p1(v) , we have a contradiction to the defini‑
tion of p1(v) . So, ({1};�) ∉ EW (v) . By Lemma 2, each coalition in N⧵((1)∪S ) is of 
size at most p1(v) , implying that S′ is the unique largest coalition in 
′ . We then 
have, by Proposition 5, that (S�






 and |(1)| − 1 other members of S

 . Having in mind that 
||S⧵S�|| = ||S|| − p1(v) − 1 ≥ |(1)| − 1 is satisfied, it follows from applying grow‑
symmetry ( |(1)| − 1)‑times and monotonicity of v that S′′














∈ EW (v), showing that assertion (1) holds. 
(2) ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| implies ((1);) ∈ EW (v).
Suppose that ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| . We split the proof in showing that 
((1);) ∈ EW (v) follows when either ||S|| ≤ p1(v) or p1(v) < ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| 
holds.
(2.1) ( ||S|| ≤ p1(v) implies ((1);) ∈ EW (v) ). Suppose that ||S|| ≤ p1(v) . In view 






∈ EW (v) leads to a contradic‑
tion. For this, notice that, by the monotonicity of v, S

 would be winning in the 
partition ∗ = {S

} ∪ {{i}}i∈N⧵S . Let 
′ be a partition with respect to which pv(1) 




∈ EW (v) . 
Take S ⊆ T  with |S| = ||S|| (such a coalition S does exist due to |T| = pv(1) ≥ ||S|| ), 
and let �� = {S} ∪ {{i}}i∈N⧵S be the partition containing S with all other players 




∈ EW (v) since {1} is winning in ′ . 
Due to 1 ∉ T ⊇ S and 1 ∉ S

 , the players in S

∪ S are switch‑symmetric in v, and 
we can exchange the players from S

 by those from S (in the partition ∗ ) as to con‑
clude that S should be the winning coalition in ′′ . This gives a contradiction to (
{1};��
)
∈ EW (v) and the decisiveness of v. Therefore, (S ;) ∉ EW (v) , and by 
Proposition 5, ((1);) ∈ EW (v).
(2.2) ( p1(v) < ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| implies ((1),) ∈ EW (v) ). Suppose that 
p1(v) <
||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| . Let S′𝜋 ⊂ S𝜋 contain exactly p1(v) players. Consider 







 , and notice that, 
by Lemma 2, each coalition in N⧵((1)∪S ) is of size at most p1(v) . The latter fact 
implies that the winning coalition in ′ is either {1} (if there is a coalition in 
N⧵((1)∪S )
 of size p1(v) and by Corollary 1) or S′ (if the size of each coalition in 
N⧵((1)∪S )









∈ EW (v) should follow.
To get to a contradiction, suppose that (S�













∈ EW (v) . Let ′′′ be a partition with respect to which pv(1) was calculated, 




∈ EW (v) . By monotonic‑




∈ EW (v) , where iv is the partition containing T with everyone 
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else being single. Since ||S�|| = |T| = pv(1) , and all players in S
�

∪ T  are switch‑
symmetric in v, in the partition ′′ , we can replace all players from S′

 by those from 
T as to conclude that T should be winning in the partition containing it with every‑














Having in mind that ||S𝜋|| < p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| implies ||S|| ≤ p1(v) + |(1)| − 1 
and thus |𝜋(1)| − 1 ≥ ||S𝜋|| − p1(v) = ||S𝜋⧵S�𝜋|| > 0 , it follows from monotonic‑
ity and applying grow‑symmetry ||S⧵S′||‑times that Q







∪ {{r}}r∈(1)⧵Q∗ , where Q∗ contains player 1 and ||S⧵S′|| 
other members of (1) . By monotonicity of v, ((1);) ∈ EW (v) .   ◻
Proof of Theorem 3 Let v be a decisive and (n − 1)‑symmetric plurality game defined 
on the player set N, and let v({1};a) = 1 . Take the weight vector w ∈ XN
+




 and wi =
1
p1(v)+|N|−1
 for each i ∈ N⧵{1} . In order to show that w is 
supporting the game v, we explicitly consider the two cases in which N contains 
either at most four players (Case A)5 or at least five players (Case B).
Case A ( |N| ≤ 4 ): For |N| = 2 , take N = {1, 2} and notice that v is then defined 
by v({1};{{1}, {2}}) = 1 and v({1, 2};{{1, 2}}) = 1 . We have p1(v) = 1 and, by 








 . Clearly, the weight 
vector w supports the game v.
If |N| = 3 , take N = {1, 2, 3} . Recall that {1} is winning in the atomistic partition 
and, due to monotonicity of v, (1) is winning in all partitions  ∈ P with |(1)| ≥ 2 . 
























 . It can be checked that, in either case, the constructed weights support 
the corresponding game.
Suppose finally that |N| = 4, and let us take N = {1, j, k,} . By assumption, {1} 
is winning in the atomistic partition. Further, by monotonicity of v and (n − 1)‑
(grow‑)symmetry, (1) is winning in all partitions  ∈ P with |(1)| ≥ 2 . Consider 
now partitions of the type {{1}, {j, k}, {}} and notice that, by decisiveness, mono‑
tonicity, and {1} being wining in the atomistic partition, it is impossible that {} 
wins in {{1}, {j, k}, {}} . By (n − 1)‑(switch‑)symmetry, if {j, k} wins in that parti‑
tion, it is also winning in all partitions of the same type. In such a case, monotonic‑















 . If it is player 1 who wins in all partitions of type {{1}, {j, k}, {}} , 
then we get p1(v) = 3 (if {1} wins in {{1}, {j, k,}} ) or p1(v) = 2 (if {j, k,} wins in 




























5 Recall that, by Theorem 1, every decisive plurality game with at most four players is weighted. What 
we show in Case A is that every decisive and (n − 1)‑symmetric plurality game with at most four players 
is supported by the weight vector w specified above.
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Case B ( |N| ≥ 5 ): Take  ∈ P and notice that in view of Proposition 5 and by 
the fact that each player in N⧵{1} has the same weight according to w, it suffices to 
compare the weights of the coalitions (1) and a largest coalition in ⧵{(1)} . There 
are only two possible cases for the partition  : either  ∈ P∗ or  ∈ P⧵P∗.
Case B.1 (  ∈ P∗ ): If p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| > ||S𝜋|| , then ((1);) ∈ EW (v) follows from 
Proposition 6. We have then





∈ EW (v) and thus,
In either case, the game v is supported by weight vector w.
Case B.2 ( ∈ P⧵P∗ ): By Corollary 1, ((1);) ∈ EW (v) . Let S be a largest coali‑
tion in ⧵{(1)} and consider the following possibilities.
(B2.1) ( |N| and |N⧵(1)| are even numbers): We have in this case |S| ≤ |N|−|(1)|
2
 
and thus, w(S) ≤ |N|−|(1)|
2(p1(v)+|N|−1)
 . On the other hand,
where the inequality follows due to Lemma  1. Notice further that |N| − |𝜋(1)| > 
|N| − 4 + 2|(1)| would be fulfilled only if |(1)| = 1 , which is in contra‑
diction to both |N| and |N⧵(1)| being even numbers. We conclude that 
|N| − 4 + 2|(1)| ≥ |N| − |(1)| , and thus, w((1)) ≥ w(S).
(B2.2) ( |N| and |N⧵(1)| are odd numbers): We have in this case |(1)| ≥ 2 and 
|S| ≤ |N|−|(1)|−1
2
 , and thus, w(S) ≤ |N|−|(1)|−1
2(p1(v)+|N|−1)
 . On the other hand,
where the inequality follows due to Lemma  1. In this case, 
|N| − 3 + 2|𝜋(1)| > |N| − |𝜋(1)| − 1 always holds and thus, w(𝜋(1)) > w(S).
(B2.3) ( |N| is even and |N⧵(1)| is odd): We have in this case |S| ≤ |N|−|(1)|−1
2
 and 
thus, w(S) ≤ |N|−|(1)|−1
2(p1(v)+|N|−1)
 . On the other hand,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + |(1)| − 1
p1(v) + |N| − 1
≥
||S||








p1(v) + |N| − 1
>
p1(v) + |𝜋(1)| − 1
p1(v) + |N| − 1
= w(𝜋(1)).
w((1)) =
p1(v) + |(1)| − 1




+ |(1)| − 1
p1(v) + |N| − 1
=
|N| − 4 + 2|(1)|
2
(
p1(v) + |N| − 1
) ,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + |(1)| − 1




+ |(1)| − 1
p1(v) + |N| − 1
=
|N| − 3 + 2|(1)|
2
(
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where the inequality holds due to Lemma  1. From 
|N| − 4 + 2|(1)| ≥ |N| − |(1)| − 1 , we conclude that w((1)) ≥ w(S).
(B2.4) ( |N| is odd and |N⧵(1)| is even): We have in this case |S| ≤ |N|−|(1)|
2
 and 
thus, w(S) ≤ |N|−|(1)|
2(p1(v)+|N|−1)
 . On the other hand,
where the inequality holds due to Lemma  1. In this case, 
|N| − 3 + 2|(1)| ≥ |N| − |(1)| holds, and thus, w((1)) ≥ w(S) .   ◻
Proof of Proposition 7 Consider an externality‑free decisive plurality game v and 
suppose that, w.l.o.g., player 1 is the unique winner in the atomistic partition. Since 
there are no externalities, we have that {1} is the unique winning coalition in any 
partition containing {1} . But then, by monotonicity of v, (1) is winning in every 
partition  ∈ P . Taking the vector w with w1 = 1 and wi = 0 for each i ∈ N⧵{1} 
then shows that v is weighted.   ◻
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